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THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF
INDIVIDUALISM AND TRAGEDY IN
MARTIN ARROWSMITH'S
EXPEDITION TO ST. HUBERT*
Thomas L. Shaffer**

Sinclair Lewis (1885-1951) was a resolute critic of pretension in American
business and in the professions. His only hero story is the story of a
physician and research scientist, Arrowsmith (1925).' It is a story that puts
up for examination Lewis's prescription for a moral life in the professions
in America and, beyond that, it shows what professional life is like. I
want to argue here that (1) although the story is useful for lawyers and
for legal ethics, Lewis's principal moral prescription, a brief for individualism in professional life, is incoherent. The ethic of individualism, as
Lewis grounds it, depends on an anthropology that is not a truthful
description of our situation. Lewis's ethic is an argument for individualism
as a virtue that rests on this untruthful anthropology, and is therefore

* This is a revised version of a "Law as a Tragic Profession," a lecture
given to the Workshop for Teachers of Civil Procedure, Association of American
Law Schools, June 5, 1988, at the University of Virginia. I dedicate it to the Law
Class of 1988 of the University of Missouri, Columbia.
**
B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; member of the Indiana Bar. I am grateful for the thoughtful
assistance of Thomas D. Eisele, Stanley Hauerwas, James W. McClendon, H.
Jefferson Powell, Mary M. Shaffer and Nancy J. Shaffer.
1. S. LEwIs, ARuowsMrrH (1925) (introduction by William Soskin, 1933).
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incoherent in its description of reality and in its consequent failure to
indicate the difference between a good life and an evil life.
But then I want to argue (2) that the story of Dr. Arrowsmith's struggle
with plague on the island of St. Hubert, which is the heart of the novel,
is valuable for ethics in the professions: It shows that life in the professions
is tragic, tragic because it is limited. We doctors, lawyers, teachers, and
ministers want to help, but-even in moral struggle, and even at our bestwe cannot help enough. 2 We are limited, and we find, when we look closely
at our limits, that it is our ideals that limit us. Our traditions of helpfulness
become obstacles to our being helpful. "It takes a long time before a man
gets to understand what his duty is," as Martin Buber's Yehudi put it.
"It is the duties that prevent him from doing so." 3 Arrowsmith is, then,
useful for the professions, despite Lewis's failure to make a persuasive
case for the virtue of individualism.
I.

APROWSMITH (AND LAWYERS)

Martin Arrowsmith in medical school was like the law student who
gets top grades and wants to be the editor of the law review. Arrowsmith
thought of himself as a scholar of healing, as, perhaps, a zealous lawreview editor comes to think of herself as a scholar of order. (Order is
to lawyering what healing is to the practice of medicine.) Arrowsmith was
interested in science. (Science is in professional healing what law is in
professional ordering.)
In mid-career Arrowsmith found himself coming from a large, prosperous clinic in Chicago to a new job, working with his medical school
model and mentor, Dr. Max Gottlieb, in the McGurk Institute, a research
foundation in New York. (He was like the former law-review editor, coming

home from Wall Street or one of its functional equivalents, home to law
school, as most of us law teachers did, to join the faculty.) Martin, in
single-minded devotion to the truth of science, quickly scored; he discovered
his phage, a serum that appeared to prevent plague. (This is like getting
your tenure piece accepted for the Harvard Law Review.) Not only that,
he got a chance to try out the phage on an isolated population in the
middle of a plague epidemic. St. Hubert, an island in the Lesser Antilles,
sent for him in its suffering. It sent for the doctor.
But the doctor was a scientist. The last thing Dr. Gottlieb told Martin,
as Martin got on the boat, was to remember to have a control group: Be
sure in your science to give sterile water to every other threatened person

2. Hauerwas, Medicine as a Tragic Profession, in TRuTHYUNESS AND TRAa184 (1977); Maclntyre, How Virtues Become Vices, in EVALUATION AND ExPLANATION IN THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 110 (H.Englehardt & S. Spiker eds. 1975).
EDY

3.

1953).
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BUBER, FoR THE SAKE OF HEAVEN 85 (L. Lewisohn trans.,
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you meet, so that science can learn from your patients whether your serum
is any good. If your serum is good, the half of your patients who get
water will die. Gottlieb's reasons were substantial moral reasons, although
they might- not have seemed sound to the suffering people of the island:
The good of society is served by having a proven serum, and for that
good it is necessary to risk disease and death in half of those who come
to be treated. (Science here works the way trials work. Justice in trial law
sorts people into winners and losers in a similar way, in similar proportions,
and at an analogous social cost.)
Martin failed the test of science. He tried for a while to keep his
control group, but finally the healer in him took over and he gave the
serum to everybody. The plague was stopped; Martin's career as a scientist
was retarded. (It's as if the editors of the Harvard Law Review sent the
tenure piece back, after it had gone into galley proofs, and said they had
decided to publish an essay by Professor Owen Fiss instead.)
What Martin was left with for his scientific report was merely clinical
evidence and clinical judgment: He could say that he gave the phage to
497 people and only two of them got plague. He could not say who would
have contracted plague, then and there, if they had not had the serum.
He had practiced healing but he had not practiced science; all he had to
show for his pains was 495 people restored to their family and friends,

and that result was not scientific.
My view is that the lives of lawyers are tragic, as Martin Arrowsmith's
expedition to St. Hubert was tragic-tragic in his being with those who
died even after they got his serum; tragic in his merely being with the
patients who already had the disease when he got to them; tragic personally
in terms of his own suffering, including the death of his wife from plague;
tragic professionally in his refusal to be a scientist when it was possible
for him to be a healer. The lesson for legal ethics is that there is such
tragedy in all of professional life. But, before that issue comes clear in
the story of St. Hubert, there is, in Justice Holmes's homey metaphor,
green scum to be cleaned off the pool: 4 the ethical claim Lewis makes in
the novel, his brief for the virtue of individualism.
II.

LEwis's PRoFEssIoNAL ETIc OF INDrIVDuAIsM

Lewis fiad written about a vacuous and hypocritical businessman (Babbitt, 1922), and about social life in the small-town American Midwest (Main
Street, 1920). Both novels were commercially successful; neither had heroes;
"angry, indignant, sick in the heart of the false standards of success, of
the empty worship of pecuniary ambition and of the blatant, raucous

4. PoLocK-HoruMs
Feb. 21, 1909).

LETTrEs 147 (M. Howe ed. 1942) (to Lady Pollock,
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monster that emerged from the pioneering efforts of his grandfathers on
the various frontiers of American life, [Lewis] poured his wrath down upon
the heads of his neighbors." 5 Lewis decided, after these bitter successes
as a novelist, to write a hero story. That meant that he had to choose
something for his hero to do, and for that he had at hand the profession
of medicine: He came from a family of doctors. Then he had to have an
idealism for his hero to pursue. He chose scientific medicine, perhaps
because he had located an appealing hero in stories about Dr. Jacques
Loeb of the Rockefeller Institute, and had as a friend and consultant one
of Dr. Loeb's students, Dr. Paul H. DeKruif.6 Such elements gave Lewis
a context and a plot; his deep-seated and cynical American romanticism
gave him rugged individualism as a virtue for his hero to grow in and
demonstrate.
Arrowsmith's professional experience prior to his coming to the McGurk
Institute was a series of disillusionments, in rural private practice, publichealth practice, and institutional clinical practice; in each of these settings
he concluded that commerce, social climbing, and politics were at war with
healing and that healing was a more ambiguous enterprise than he had

supposed it would be. When he got to McGurk, and began to work under
Dr. Gottlieb's patronage, commerce, social life, and politics were temporarily held at bay. It was possible for him to look more clearly at the
distinction between healing and science-and to choose science.
Thus Lewis had his hero's profession defined. He had also indicated,
through his character, an anthropology: Arrowsmith was a person who got
along professionally without human associations; he moved from job to
job, all over the country, but he did not turn to other physicians or
institutional associates for his understanding of what he was doing as a
doctor. He was all alone. This was to suggest not only an anthropology,
an understanding of how people are in a profession, but also to begin to
suggest that individualism was desirable as a habit or disposition, as a
virtue, a skill, as something to train oneself for. Based on this (as I think)
untrue anthropology, Lewis made a case for individualism as virtue, and
described it (as classical ethics defines the virtues) in terms of a tension
between two alternative and undesirable habits. Virtue is described as the
habitual resolution of-the learned skill for resolving-such a tension.7

5. Soskin, Introduction to S. LEwis, supra note 1.
6. Griffin, Introduction to TWENTIMT CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS

OF AR-

ROWSmITH 1 (R. Griffin ed. 1968) [hereinafter TWENTMTH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS].

7. "Moral virtue," Aristotle said, "is produced by habit.... The mean
and the good is feeling at the right time, about the right things, in relation to the
right people, and for the right reason; and the mean and the good are the task
of virtue. Similarly, in regard to actions, there are excess, deficiency, and the
mean." Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, in Tim Pnn.osopm, oF ARSTOTLE
303, 306 (R. Bambrough ed. 1963). "[A]ny depiction of virtue will reflect beliefs
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The critics agreed that Lewis described a tension. They did not agree
on what the tension was. Most of them at the time judged that Arrowsmith,
as the earlier satirical novels had in business and social contexts, described
the tension between moral life and commerce; the virtue of individualism
lay, here, between the practice of commercial medicine (as Arrowsmith had
practiced it in a clinic in Chicago) and the abandonment of any connection
with human institutions to pursue truth in lonely objectivity (which is what
Arrowsmith did at the end of the novel).8 A few critics thought the tension
was more specifically professional. They saw it as the tension, in medicine,
between science and healing. 9 Either view set up the argument for individualism as virtue, but the latter was clearer: The virtue of individualism
is unlikely in a healer's life, since that life is contingent, not exact, an art
(as the practice of medicine is often described) and not a science, and a
life lived in continuous association with people who are ill and afraid. 10
Lewis himself apparently sought this latter tension, so that his description
of the virtue of individualism depends on the comparison of lonely science
with the associations involved in the life of a healer. In his view (I think)
what made the story ethically interesting, and made it possible for Dr.
Arrowsmith to be a hero, was his doctor's moral and psychological isolation
from the influence of other people-free both from the influences of
professional colleagues in science and from suffering patients in healing.
There are two moral episodes in the novel: One contrasts medicine (as
science or as healing or as both) and success. The other (success having
been set aside as an issue) contrasts science and healing. In both episodes,

about human nature and its possibilities," Gilbert Meilaender said. Meilaender,
Joseph Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of Virtue, 11 J.
RELIGI us ETIcs 114, 116 (1983). Arrowsmith's claim for the virtue of individualism
is a claim about right in the senses Aristotle spoke of, as well as a statement
about human nature, as Meilaender says. Finally, Arrowsmith's ethic is an epistemology: Virtues are "standards by which to measure and evaluate the self,"
Meilaender says. "They influence the way we describe reality." MELANDER, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VIRTUE 6, 18 (1984).
8. Schorer, On Arrowsmith, in TWENTIETH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 6, at 40; Canby, Fighting Success, id. at 110.
9. Rosenberg, Martin Arrowsmith: The Scientist as Hero, in TWENTIETH
CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 6, at 47; Ober, "Arrowsmith and the Last
Adam," id. at 57; Dooley, Arrowsmith, id. at 61.
10. May, The Virtues in a ProfessionalSetting, in ANNUAL OF THE SOCIETY
OF CmuST aN ETHICs 72 (1984) (argues for a morality of fidelity and of covenant
in reference to relationships with patients and clients); W. May, Notes on the
Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers (1977) (Poynter Center monograph) (makes a similar
argument in reference to the ethical tradition in medicine); E. CASSELL, THE HEALER'S
ART (1979) (speaks of the "connection" between physician and patient as a source
of healing). See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); L.
THOmAs, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE (1983). Affection is indispensable to being a good
doctor, Thomas says; "touching the patient is beneficial and needed." Id. at 5657.
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Arrowsmith endured because he stood alone. He left any job in which he
could not do what he wanted to do-a luxury few Americans have had.
He had two wives; the first was subservient to whatever he wanted to do,
and died young because of his work. The other wife he left when she
made claims on him that came from her world rather than from his. They
had a child; she argued that it was wrong of Arrowsmith to leave her and
their child. "It's just that argument that's kept almost everybody, all these
centuries, from being anything but a machine for digestion and propagation
and obedience," he said. His positive argument for abandoning his family
was that he wanted to be alone: "I want my freedom to work," he said.
Lewis's hero, like Lewis himself, D.J. Dooley wrote, was "the great
undisciplined American, the apotheosis of American individuality and irresponsibility."" Dooley was right about individuality but, his accusation
of "irresponsibility" may be misleading. Lewis's and Arrowsmith's is a
moral argument: American individuality was, to them, a way to be virtuous
2
(and therefore responsible).1

The novel begins with a sort of epigraph, a scene of Arrowsmith's
great-grandmother, making her way westward in a covered wagon. She is
a young woman. She has left her eastern home; her father and her children
are also in the wagon. Her mother has died along the way; her father lies
dying in the back of the wagon. He asks her to go back to relatives who
can take care of him. "'Nobody ain't going to take us in,' she says. 'We're
going on jus' long as we can. Going West!'
Some reviewers decided that Arrowsmith's great grandmother's individualism was the novel's moral claim; they described Lewis's judgment
as being that the opposite to science in Arrowsmith's life was commerce
and success (which, to Lewis, in America, were the same thing). "The real
story," Mark Schorer wrote, "involves the conflict between an ideal of
scientific research and the crass threats of commercial compromise with
that ideal.' 1 3 Martin was fighting for his integrity, Schorer said. Charles
E. Rosenberg said Lewis chose the medical profession as "one in which
dignity and integrity could be maintained in a world of small compromise
' 4
and petty accommodation."'
The alternative critical view saw the expedition to St. Hubert (a small
part of the novel) as the heart of the story, and, with that focus, identified
the tension as one between science described by Lewis's romantic individ-

11.

Dooley, supra note 9, at 61.

12. This is true of responsibility in the sense in which H. Richard Niebuhr
described it-as an ethic of the response that is fitting. But I doubt that Niebuhr
would endorse individualism as a virtue; his notion of responsibility was an ethic
formed in reference to the community. R. NmBuHR, THE REsPONSMLE SELF 140
(1979).

13. Schorer, On Arrowsmith, in TWEN'ITH
at 43.
14. Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 47-48.

pra note 6,

CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS,

su-
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ualism at one end and-not commerce, but-healing at the other. Not
individualism and commerce, but individualism and healing. D. J. Dooley
described the story-and admired it-in those terms:15
Should the quest for scientific knowledge override every other human

consideration? In Gottlieb's life, it does. Martin decides in favor of
humanitarianism when he abandons his controlled experiment on St. Hubert
during an epidemic ... and administers his serum to everyone, but he
regards himself as a traitor to science. At the end, he casts everything
else aside for the sake of research. The pursuit of truth to the exclusion
of error is clearly something desirable; the pursuit of scientific truth to
the exclusion of all human values is something else again. We have moved,

therefore, from an area in which satire attacks deviations from a reasonable,
normal position to an area in which there is a dramatic tension between
two kinds of value.

I prefer Dooley's reading to Schorer's and Rosenberg's. The story is trivial
if it is about a rugged individual who turns away from vulgar success and
fashion, as the cowboy in the movie gets on his pony and rides out of
the night club, into the boulevard, on his way back to the ranch. Trivial
and probably wrong as well. Sheldon N. Grebstein said of Lewis's moral
6
argument in the story:1

[T]he scientist must have a wife, children, and friends who are totally

permissive and understanding, who will always be there when he needs
them but not there when they might be in the way.... [The best and
perhaps the only possible way to forestall the dangers of the world is to
get away from it, to seek isolation. The novel's final conclusion implies,

therefore, that the scientist is truest to himself and to mankind when he
rejects his own humanity.

Arrowsmith is, Grebstein possibly to the contrary, a significant story if it
is a story about science in opposition to healing, or even if it is thought
of (in fairness to Dr. Gottlieb) as about one kind of healing as opposed
to another. If those are the terms in which the moral tension on St. Hubert
is defined-and if St. Hubert is the heart of the story-Arrowsmith is also
a story about tragedy, more interesting than a story about individualism.
It is more interesting even if it requires taking the view that Lewis probably
told a better story than he had in mind or than his anthropology could
encompass. (It has happened to other novelists.)
The issue of individualism in Arrowsmith thus has to be disposed of
before the issue of tragedy can be reached. The tension has to be seen as
one between noble science and noble healing; then it can be tragic. Lewis's
resolute disdain for human institutions, his inability to see relationships in
any light except domination and submission, have to be cleared away before
the story of St. Hubert can be a tragedy. Institutions and communities

15.

16.

Dooley, supra note 9, at 64.

Grebstein, The Best of the Great Decade, in
supra note 6, at 68.

TERPRETATIONS,

Tw-rENrT

CENTURY IN-
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are unavoidable in moral discourse, as they are in life;
to speak as if they can be left out of account; it is not
of science as if it were not, and did not have to be, an
if it can never be a community. Lewis "nowhere gives a

[Vol. 54
it is not truthful
truthful to speak
institution, or as
picture of a true

home or a true church or a true corporate life of any kind; he has taken
the tradition of dissent to its logical and ultimate conclusion," Dooley

said. But "there is always a system of some kind, and17the argument against
system per se is usually either fretful or ignorant."'
Because institutions and communities cannot be avoided, and because
a moral course that sets itself against reality is not helpful in ethics, Lewis's
individualism, although indicatively romantic, in a uniquely American way,
is also incoherent: It provides no rational way to distinguish the morally
admirable person from the reprobate. As Henry Seidel Canby put it, when
the novel was published:"8
There is essentially no greater clarity of mind in those who like Martin
and Gottlieb despise success than in ... the cynical ... who yearn for
it. The idealists have no plan except to be always working at their passion.
They are just as strenuous, just as irresponsible, just as disregardful of
any end except their own pleasure. The difference is solely that Lewis's
heroes work at something greater than themselves, while his villains serve
their baser instincts. To a saint, or an ascetic, or even to a civilized
European all might seem to be mad though with a difference in the morals

of their madness.
I think that Lewis told a better story than he had in mind, a better story
than his moral anthropology would bear. That story has to do with
Arrowsmith's expedition to St. Hubert, where science and healing were in
tension, in the doctor's heart and in the minds and hearts of his professional
colleagues. That tension is not romantic; it is earthy, pervasive, and painful.
III. THE MoRAL TENSION IN Ti

EXPEDITION TO ST. HUBERT

The moral tension in Arrowsmith's visit to St. Hubert is serious and
interesting: There are ethical lessons in it, lessons for lawyers. There is
social ethics in it; there is professional ethics in it; and there is tragedy.
The argument to delay the use of a promising treatment for illness,

until the treatment can be evaluated by bureaucrats or scientists, is familiar

17. Dooley, supra note 9, at 61. Stanley Hauerwas speaks of the medical
fraternity as a practice-a source of the virtues of justice, truthfulness, and courage.
S. HAuERwAs, StwrERING PESENcE 51-54 (1986). Lewis Thomas described a scientific community that would have met Hauerwas's criteria. L. THOMAS, THE LIvEs
OF A CELL-NoTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 68-74 (1979). He made similar observations about Bellevue Hospital, veterinary medical students at the University of
California-Davis, and the professional tradition (in law as well as in medicine) of
sharing the discovery of information with professional colleagues. L. THOMAS, THE
YOUNGEST SCIENCE 135, 186-87, 206 (1983).
18. Canby, supra note 8, at 112.
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to those who read newspaper stories about lethargy in the Food and Drug
Administration on the use of placebos in the search for a cure for Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome. That social argument was focused in Arrowsmith's story when the desperate people of the island sent for help.
Even if the people who were asked to help claimed to be research scientistsnot healers-they were, even so, trained to be healers. There was an
expectation of cure in those who called for help-cure rather than the
solution to a scientific problem-and there was, in the scientists who listened
to the call, no claim that the call had been directed to the wrong people.
They accepted that they were called in to be healers. (The issue in placebosas experiment or as therapy-is an issue about deceit. 9)
Arrowsmith's professional colleague in the expedition to St. Hubert
was Dr. Gustaf Sondelius, a world-famous enemy of epidemics, ruthless
destroyer of insects and mammals that carry disease, a single-minded and
violent combatant:
Sondelius wanted to exterminate all the rodents in St. Hubert, to enforce
a quarantine ... and to give Martin's phage to everybody ... all at
once.... Martin protested.... He knew, he flung at them, that humanitarian feeling would make it impossible to use the poor devils of
sufferers as mere objects of experiment, but he must have at least a few
real test cases, and he was damned ... if he would have his experiment
so mucked up by multiple treatment that they could never tell whether
the cures weie due to [other medications] or phage or none of them.
The trustees adopted his plan. After all, while they desired to save
humanity, wasn't it better to have it saved by a McGurk representative
than by ... the outlandish Sondelius.

Arrowsmith was determined, as he put it, not "to give up the possible
saving of millions for the immediate saving of thousands." He retained
his determination while he worked on St. Hubert, for a relatively long
time; no doubt many people on the island died who would not have died
if he had given them more than sterile water. "[H]e would not yield to
a compassion which in the end would make all compassion futile." An
unproved medication will not be available when it is needed, because doctors
and governments do not feel confident in its usefulness and business
consequently does not manufacture it. "[D]o not let anything, not even
your own kind heart, spoil your experiment," Dr. Gottlieb told Martin.
"[T]here must be knowledge. So many men ... are kind and neighborly;
so few have added to knowledge. You have the chance! You may be the
man who ends all plague."
It is hard to assess such an altruistic claim without being cynical,
especially when you consider the price paid by members of the control
group, or by those who die while science waits for its evidence. Gottlieb's

19. See generally Brody, The Lie That Heals-The Ethics of Giving Placebos,
7 Soc. Rasp.: JouRNcALIsM, L., MED. 27 (1981).

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

claim is not altruistic in the first place: All humanitarian social argument
is sustained by self-interest and earthy friendship. Self-interest throws doubt
on Gottlieb's moral claim, even though we should probably admit that no
social argument is sustained without self-interest-even though we admit
that in the American professions, if not in other systems of social ethics,
altruism is sustained by friendship; it is always subject to an accusation
of elitism, clannishness, or nepotism.
Dr. Gottlieb's humanitarian social argument ("so few have added to
knowledge") is perhaps strong enough to display a tension between social
altruism and a corresponding humanitarian argument from Dr. Sondelius;
but Gottlieb's is also, of course, an argument from and to self-interest
("you may be the man"). It is an argument tinged with hubris. Gottlieb
himself "was like a fabulous painter, so contemptuous of popular taste
that after a lifetime of creation he should destroy everything he had done,
lest it be marred and mocked by the dull eyes of the crowd." Gottlieb,
Lewis said, thus harbored "concentrated indifference" to demands for
healing.
Martin, who may have remembered that he was first attracted to the
medical profession because he wanted to make money, said to his wife,
"Pretty soon, if I'm successful in St. Hubert, I'll begin to count in science."
And she said, "Going places!" That edge of self-interest is, to the worldly
reviewer's mind, nothing less than realism: "Martin Arrowsmith is an
unheroically complex, often confused and faltering, rather selfish and unprofound person whose importance as a character does not depend on his
fully succeeding in the quest to which he has dedicated his life,"2 0 Griffin
said. The presence of self-interest does not defeat the social argument:
Idealism is sustained by self-interest.
The keener lesson about moral claims in professional life is a lesson
about self-deception. The idealism of professional life makes it possible to
disguise arrogance and self-interest in social idealism and claims of objectivity. 2' We professionals get to do what we do because we have power,
and power seeks moral justification, seeks it even in deception. "Martin
swore ...

that he would observe test conditions; he would determine

forever the value of phage by the contrast between patients treated and
untreated, and so, perhaps, end all plague forever; he would harden his
heart and keep clear his eyes." He was able to preserve his own interests,
endure (for a while anyway) the moral tension that the social issue presented
to him, and at the same time claim the idealism, because he had power;
as Sheldon Grebstein put it, "the world needs him, and both he and the

20.
21.

See supra note 16.
Hauerwas & Burrell, Self-Deception and Autobiography: Reflections on

Speer's Inside the Third Reich, in Tiu=LrNrss m

TRAGEDY,

supra note 2.

FINGAIRITE, SELF-DEcEPTION (1969). See T. SHAF-ER, AmiucAN LEGAL Enucs,
ch. 6-7 (1985), on self-deception in law firms.
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world know it. The same was not true of Carol [the Midwestern housewife
of Lewis's Main Street] and [Lewis's businessman George] Babbitt. Once
isolated from their society, there would be no place for them to go."22
Among powerful professional people, the social issue is kept in contention
by claims of truth and of healing, sustained by power and self-interest,
disguised enough by moral claims to keep self-interest intact. Disguised by
the importance of the moral issue and by humanitarian rhetoric.
The point is at least mildly ironic, because Martin Arrowsmith's stub-

born determination to preserve the experiment on St. Hubert was not
sustained as much by humanitarian altruism as it was sustained by friendship; earthy, self-interested friendship. Martin worried about being a good
scientist because he sought the approval and affection of his mentor, Dr.
Gottlieb. His conscience was kept in tension by the demands of healing
and the implications of the request to him to heal St. Hubert, at one end,
and by personal loyalty-love, I think-at the other. Martin would not
have been able to withstand the evidence of death and suffering all around
him on the island with the altruistic inspiration of science. He would have
faltered sooner but for Gottlieb's personal demand on Martin's loyalty.
Gottlieb was growing old; he had not accomplished what he hoped to
accomplish in science; he had been deterred from his lonely experiments by
the burdens of taking over the administration of the Institute-a post he
accepted out of a pride that was at war with his dedication to science. The
expedition to St. Hubert held for Gottlieb a promise of personal vindication:
"Martin, I grow old.... Let nothing, neither beautiful pity nor fear of
your own death, keep you from making this plague experiment complete.
And as my friend-if you do this, something will yet come out of my
Directorship. If but one fine thing should come, to justify me - ." The
altruistic social argument was less powerful than the claim put on Martin
by his oldest and perhaps his only friend.2Y
This subjective effect of friendship on professional behavior is something
Lewis would have been the first to condemn: It is cronyism of the sort
he saw all over in American fraternal and communal life, and he despised
it. It is ironic that he made it a determinative force in his hero story, but
he did. (Maybe he didn't know friendship when he saw it.) He would have

been the last to admit that a noble ideal could be sustained by friendship,
although he might have recognized, as Griffin noticed, that Martin was
entirely capable of being selfish.

22. See supra note 16.
23. I have argued for a similar moral connection between George Eliot's
young physician, Tertius Lydgate, and the older parson, Camden Farebrother, in
Middlemarch (1871). See T. SHArFR, FArriH AND = PROFESSIONS, ch. 4 (1987).
The ethics of friendship in such stories is, I think, a matter of character rather
than code.
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The irony dissipates when the altruistic claim is sustained by fraternalism, by the friendship within a calling that Alasdair MacIntyre,2 Stanley
Hauerwas,25 and James W. McClendon 6 have lately taught ethics to call
a "practice." There is, within the competing altruistic claims of Sondelius
on the one hand and Gottlieb on the other-and in the consciences of
physicians in the story who were more ambivalent-a serious and relatively
less self-deceived argument about what medicine should do.
Sondelius opposed the use of St. Hubert's people for experimental
purposes. He went to the island to battle the plague with all of the
knowledge, experience, and power that he had. He argued that the phage
should be given to everyone on the island; he was so firm in this that he
refused the phage himself, unless Martin gave it to everyone, even though
he did his professional work in the most dangerous places on the island.
Finally, as he must have known he would, Sondelius died of plague. He
held to his position in the argument with unusual sincerity, but, to him,
it was nonetheless a professional argument: "Sondelius . .. insisted that
in this crisis mere experimentation was heartless, yet he listened to Martin's
close-reasoned fury with ...

enthusiasm ...

[as for] anything which

sounded new and preferably true." He knew, and knew professionally,
that a healer had often to override the resistance of those being healed:
"How many times, in how many lands, had Gustaf Sondelius flattered
pro-consuls, and persuaded the heathen to let themselves be saved!" He
was also prepared to see others pay the price for his convictions; 27 in his
ardent blowing of poison gas into infected warehouses on St. Hubert, there
was not time to be thorough in removing people; a tramp was poisoned
to death in one of them: 'Poor fella-bury him,' said Sondelius. There
was no inquest."
Sondelius took one side of the professional argument. Dr. Stokes, a
missionary physician working in St. Swithin's Parish, took the other side.
Dr. Stokes's parishioners were dying from plague; he finally died from it
himself, and yet he said, "Arrowsmith, I have a notion of what you may
want to do experimentally. If [the Surgeon General of St. Hubert] balks,
you come to me in my parish-if I'm still alive."
Because the argument was professional, Martin Arrowsmith himself
understood the argument more as a doctor would than as either an extraprofessional social or humanitarian issue. It was the healer in him that
recognized the tension created by his friendship for Dr. Gottlieb; finally
he saw his failure to be scientific as a matter of "honor." That is, he

24. See generally A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VirTruE: A STUY

iN MORAL THEoRY

(1981).
25. See generally supra note 17, cl. 2.
26. See generally J. McC.ENuoN, ETmcs: SYsTEMATIc THEOLOGY (1986).
27. Shaffer, The Gentleman in ProfessionalEthics, 10 QUEEN's L.J. 1, 33
(1984).
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described his failure in fraternal terms, professional terms: "Despite Stokes's
dismay, he gave the phage to everyone who asked. Only in St. Swithin's,

since there his experiment was so excellently begun [by Stokes], did some
28

remnant of honor keep him from distributing the phage universally.' '
Within the "practice," Martin had enough moral clarity to impose on
himself an odd integrity that seems to have been an attempt to endure
the tension and tragedy of his life on St. Hubert. In St. Swithin's, as
elsewhere, Martin was able to function both as scientist and healer only
by removing the few vestiges of experiment from his work as a healer.
He did one or the other: in St. Swithin's he turned the experiment over
to Stokes; elsewhere he turned the healing over to others and gave his
own time to the experiment. His social and personal life became inevitably
schizoid, but he attempted to keep his professional life orderly.29Arrowsmith
could not function as healer and scientist at the same time.
IV.

PRoFEssioNAL RESPONSES TO TRAGEDY

The ethical agenda with regard to tensions such as Arrowsmith's, as
Alasdair MacIntyre put it with regard to teaching medicine, is not that
the professional people we teach and have taught are unaware of moral
issues in their professional lives. Rather, the ethical agenda for professionals
has to do, as he says, with the strength to avoid false solutions to issues
we are aware of.30 The initial weakness in Arrowsmith, for example, is
the false solution of lonely individualism that so appealed to Sinclair Lewis
and that has, since his day, infected decision and discussion in education,
medicine, and public law-the notion, as applied in our profession, that
the highest good we can seek for ourselves or for our clients is to keep
people away from one another, to isolate them, and then to focus on their

rights rather than on their relationships.

1

In Arrowsmith, that notion was

28. See supra note 17. Honor is not, in traditional reckoning, a virtue. T.
SHAFFER, supra note 21, at 74-75; B. WYATT-BRoWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETICS
AN BmAVIOR iN THE OLD Soum 14-22 (1982), describes a culture in which
conscience submitted to convention (which is what happens in a morality of honor)
until convention took the place of conscience; when that happens, notions of
conventional morality "stress ... sociability and manliness as the highest significations of honor," and to be honorable is to be moral. By the way, if that, or
something like it, is what Lewis means in his reference to Arrowsmith's scientific
honor, he establishes a dependence on community that belies Arrowsmith's claim
to independence.
29. An analogy occurs to me: Perhaps the legal profession in America has
tried to separate advocacy and counseling in the way Arrowsmith tried to separate
his science from his healing. See Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics
of Partisanship,23 VILL. L. REv. 957, 965 (1978) (discussing the Joint Conference
Report on Professional Responsibility of 1952).
30. See supra note 2.
31. See Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REv.
963 (1987).
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untruthful; it led to an unpersuasive view of virtue in a practice, and it
hid from view the reason for the young doctor's behavior.
The ethical word MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas 2 contributed to a
discussion such as the one I have been writing about here is the word
tragedy; the false solution on which their insights focus is the denial of
tragedy.
Classical stories describe moral tragedy in terms of a choice such as
Arrowsmith had on the island. Sophocles's Antigone, ordered by the state
not to bury her dead brother, disobeyed the state in faithfulness to her
family: "Such, I hear, is the martial law our good Creon lays down for
you and me ...

[but] No, he has no right to keep me from my own."

She buried the body of Polynices, and suffered for her choice, but she
nonetheless honored the community whose demands she disobeyed: "I was
born to join in love, not hate-that is my nature."3 3 Thus Socrates, unjustly
condemned by the state to capital punishment, would not flee from Athens:
"Then they [the laws of Athens] would say, 'If you repay evil with evil,
and injustice with injustice in this shameful way, and break your agreements
and covenants ... and injure those whom you should least injure, yourself
and your friends and your country and us, and so escape, then we shall
be angry with you while you live, and when you die our brothers, the
laws in Hades, will not receive you kindly; for they will know that on
4
earth you did all that you could to destroy us." ''3
Lewis's story of the physician on St. Hubert, practicing his craft in
tension between science and healing, presents such a tragic situation. But
Lewis's argument for the virtue of individualism does not show, as Sophocles
and Plato did, a way to live with tragic choice, a way to live nobly and
at the same time to honor the claim that moral choice denies. To understand
the Greek way of living with the tragic nature of life, one has first to
recognize that the human person is a communal creature, inevitably heedful

of the claims of community (state and family, friends who weep for life,
and friends who weep for loyalty). In Lewis's context-illustrated, as I

think, by this hero story-one would have to understand that the demands
of science are as communal as the demands for healing.
Sinclair Lewis's doctor-hero story is compelling in its narrative display
of the tragic character of life in the professions. It is, beyond that, not
a plausible hero story, because Lewis's brief for the virtue of individualism
does not describe the difference between a good life in the professions and
an evil life in the professions. It is not possible, from this story, to show
rationally how it would have been moral to maintain the control groups

32. See supra note 2.
33. SoPHocLEs, Antigone in THm TmtEE TumruN PLAYs 42, 43, 68 (R. Fagles
trans. 1982).
34. PLATo, Eurmypmo, APOLOGY, CE=o 51, 63-65 (F. Church trans. 1948).
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on St. Hubert-any more than it is possible to show why it was moral
for Arrowsmith's great-grandmother to continue westward as her father
died in the back of the wagon, to refuse, as she did, to seek someone
who could care for her father. The only appeal Lewis allows his reader,
as his reader ponders the tragedy in our lives, is the appeal to the individualistic, lonely self as a moral tyrant. Lewis's critics made a moral
appeal in their rejection of the romantic individualism he urged on them.
They claimed an ethic; their ethic was to appeal to communitarian judgment
and-although they did not say so-to reject the individualism Lewis and
other chroniclers of the frontier ethic in America urged on them.
Professional life is tragic in the way Dr. Arrowsmith's situation on
St. Hubert (or Antigone's at the gates of Thebes or Socrates's in prison)
was tragic. The ethics of individualism (or of autonomy) do not show a
way to deal with the tragedy; Lewis's virtue of individualism would have
only caused Arrowsmith to turn from tragedy, to deny it, as he turned
from and denied his wife and son at the end of the novel. The fact that
he gave the phage, finally, to everyone on St. Hubert, that he turned in
compassion to his patients and turned away, in disloyalty, from his friendship for Dr. Gottlieb, does not so much illustrate a way to live with
tragedy-to be tragically professional-as it illustrates tragedy itself. And,
incidentally, the uselessness of an ethic of individuality in professional life:
In no case was Arrowsmith's action an action consequent on individuality;
he turned away from one communal commitment in order to keep another
communal commitment-he did not stand alone, and he could not have
stood alone. His claim of individuality was an empty boast.
The ethical agenda here is to speak of a way to live with tragedy in
professional life. My argument on that agenda is for a communal, not an
individualistic, way.35 Familiar professional stories, as well as familiar theory
in professional ethics, describe such a communal way, alternatively (with
some overlap) in terms of civic community, organic community, and membership in professional fraternities-or, as MacIntyre, Hauerwas, and
McClendon would have it, in "practices."
Civic Community
Republican legal ethics in America argues that lawyers are responsible
as the priests and prophets of justice in a national American community.
The Jeffersonian version of the argument sounds quaint to modern ears;
the grandfather of American legal ethics, David Hoffman of Baltimore
(1784-1854), used sacerdotal imagery for it. The lawyer's work, he said,
"expands the understanding and furnishes the heart with the purest prin-

35. See Shaffer, supra note 31; Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound
Adversary Ethic, 41 VA -D.L. REv. 697 (1988); Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Belonging, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 703 (1988).
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ciples of action .... Its office is, indeed, to adjust the disputes and to
preserve the harmony of individuals, and of society; to vindicate the laws
of God and man; and to lessen, or remove all the evils which arise from
ignorance and vice ... ministers at the altar of justice." 3 6 The communal
office of lawyers is, in that view, aristocratic-acceptance of domination
in the community and of responsibility for what the government (which
is a lawyer's means to communal ends) does to relationships. This was
perhaps the legal profession's version of a parallel control of and responsibility for health in the medical profession. (An example: The contemporaneous principle of medical ethics that laid a moral duty on the patient
not to consult a second physician. 37) The rhetoric of that early American
professionalism sounds hubristic to modern ears, but the principles remain
in the most recent consensus statements on ethics from national associations
38
of physicians and lawyers.
There is arrogance in such assertions of republican duty. Lawyers were
(are?), as Toqueville said, aristocrats in the American republic,3 9 and aristocrats tend to arrogance. But arrogance is not the ethical difficulty with
republican ethical communitarianism. The ethical difficulty is historical.
Mr. Jefferson's hope for a moral commonwealth in America has not been
realized. The common sense of moral integrity on which Jeffersonian
professionalism rested was frail when Hoffman wrote; frailer still as (Prot-

estant) American state religion was diffused by immigration, civil war, and

industrial revolution; and effectively silent (for present purposes) when the
professions began, a hundred years ago, to teach and to practice the ethics
of the marketplace. 40 Sinclair Lewis (and G.B. Shaw), 4' writing about
business and the professions during World War I and in the 1920s, had
36. T. SaArrER, supra note 21, at 59 (quoting Hoffman, Resolutions in
Regard to ProfessionalDeportment, in A CouRsE OF LEGAL STUDY, Appendix (2d
ed. 1836)).

37. J. KATz, supra note 10, at 230, 233 (quoting CODE OF ETmcs OF
AmERICAN MEDICAL AssocIATIoN 11-7 (1847)).

38.

"A lawyer is a representative ...

TH

having special responsibility for the

quality of justice." MODEL Rurrs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble (1983);
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL EnuCS (1980), quoted

in J. KATZ, supra note 10, at 237.
39. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835), quoted in T. SHAFFER, supra note 21,
at 101-105.
40. See Schudson, Public, Private, and ProfessionalLives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 191
(1977); Shaffer, supra note 21, at 183-87, 315-61; Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of
Belonging, supra note 35; M. Schudson, Origins of the Ideal of Objectivity in the
Professions: Studies in the History of American Journalism and American Law
1830-1940 (Harvard University, 1976) (unpublished); M. ScmJDsoN, DISCOVERING
TmrNnws: A SocIAL HISTORY OF AmmucAN NEWSPAPERS (1978).
41. B. SHAw, "The Doctor's Dilemma" (1909), in Tim DOCTOR'S DILEMMA
(1915); B. SHAW, GETTING MARRIED, AND THE SEwiNG-tup OF BLANco POSNET

(1928), at 1-116; R. BoxILL, SHAw AND

THE

DOCTORS (1969).
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plenty to be disgusted about, and both were closer to the truth when they
attacked not arrogance in the professions but venality among professionals.

I would not argue, though, that the practice of the professions became
morally disintegrated-then or later. What I would argue is that American
republican ethics has influenced rhetoric more than behavior, and that
behavior has been connected to the other two centers of communal morals
in my outline-organic communities and practices-more than to the pro-

fessional codes we have as the heirs of the republicans.
Organic Communities

I mean here communities which are literally organic (family and extended
family, ethnic group), and those that plausibly claim organic metaphors
(neighborhood, town, religious congregation). 42 One way to identify them

with a single notion is to appropriate Carol Greenhouse's insight that the
communities we identify with account for our behavior, so that our morals
are displayed in an explanation that is also a claim of belonging. ("I did
that because I am Irish ...

a Southern Baptist ...

a Shaffer ...

from

the South.") It is evidently the case that morals in professional life are
traceable to such communities more than to the American national identity
on which republican professional ethics rested. 43 I have worked and am
working on the argument elsewhere, and do not develop it here, except
to say that I am persuaded enough by the point to have allowed it to
guide my work as a teacher in American law schools: The most prominent,
reliable, and defensible guidance for professional life (I say to my students)

are the morals and the virtues one brings to law school from family, town,
and religious congregation.
Practices

Of course, even if organic communal influences are more prominent,
reliable, and defensible than patriotic or civic communal influences, communal influences do not deliver us from the tragic nature of professional
life. What communal influence does-or rather, has done-is to train the
professional person in useful skills for living such a life.
Stanley Hauerwas has argued that the negotiation of tragedy in a
professional's life depends on character. It depends on the careful and
truthful development of the virtues that a practice nurtures; it depends on
careful and truthful attention to the traditional values that a physician or
lawyer takes from her colleagues and teachers in a professional tradition.4

42. T.

SHA- FR,

supra note 31, at 965-66 n.8.

43. C. GREENHOUSE,
iN

A

PRAYING FOR JUSTICE-FAITH, ORDER, AND CoMMUNITY

mucAN TowN 23-42 (1986); Shaffer, supra note 35.

44. See supra notes 2 and 17 and accompanying text.
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MacIntyre summarizes those as the virtues of courage, truthfulness, and
justice. 45 The professional discussion or debate that Drs. Arrowsmith, Sondelius, and Stokes had on the morality of control groups on St. Hubert
shows how virtue in a practice works. Justice here is not justice as in
"the administration of justice," but justice as in Socrates, Aristotle, and
the Hebrew prophets. Justice as something people give to one another.
46
Justice as righteousness.
Professional care is a thing of limits. That fact and the burdens that
a profession undertakes are the sources of its tragedy. In Hauerwas's
treatment 47 (or Ivan Illich's 48), the hubris of professional medicine is that
death is a mistake: Medicine can cure. In truth, as Arrowsmith showed
in his life on the island, if not in his theories, the burden of medicine is
not to cure, but to care for: No one on St. Hubert was saved from death,
and many not on St. Hubert died sooner because Arrowsmith chose to
be a healer rather than a scientist.
Our parallel legal hubris is that we administer justice. The burden of
the law as a calling is not to provide justice but to discover and revere
the justice we find when we intrude on human relationships. In both cases
the professional person is in need of an ethic that takes into account the
nature of existence as a thing of illness and contention, of love and hate
and death, and that takes into account as well the "disasters, errors, and
helplessness" that attend professional service. 49
MacIntyre's vivid medical example is an image that is hard to forget:
In "the case of recently born crippled infants ... heroic efforts may

preserve either a needless bundle of distorted and suffering nerves and
tissues or ... a human child, physically imperfect but with real potential,

perhaps even a Helen Keller. Any rule which relieves the physician of the
burden of extending suffering uselessly imposes on him the burden of taking
innocent life wantonly; and no rule would be worst of all."5 0 Hauerwas's
is a legal example, borrowed from Richard Wasserstrom; it is the example
of professional preference-the fact that we prefer the interests of our
clients over the interests of others, as a parent prefers the interests of his
own child over those of other children.
In neither case does professional technology answer, and, because the
cases are so stressful, technology may be disastrous and erroneous as well.
If Martin Arrowsmith had been the scientist he wanted to be, half of his

2.

45. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. Supra note 24, at 175-83; T. SHArr, supra note 21, at 417-24.
47. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
48. I. ILLICH, MEDicAL NEmEsis (1976); see also S. HAUERwAS, supra note

49. S. HAuERWAS, supra note 2.
50. MacIntyre, supra note 2, at 109.
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patients would have died of plague, 5' as half the citizens who are in trials
today will lose their cases, and well more than half have lost human
relationships that are important to them and that have more to do with
justice than the judicial system can even imagine.

51.

Levis's novel does not lead to a transcendental way to live with tragedy,

but the Greeks did, and Maclntyre, Hauerwas, and McClendon do. One lived nobly
and with integrity in the Greek tragedies. The fate that was unyielding and inexplicable to the Greeks, in Hebraic understanding is a Person, a Loving Father,
the Ruler of the Universe. And so, fate is ultimately benign. In a sense, there can
be no Hebraic tragedies. There can of course be suffering, and situations in
professional life in which there seems to be no right course of action. But if the
Lord provides such situations in life, He also indicates a way to live in the situations.
Thus Hauerwas speaks of tragedy (in a Hebraic sense) as the triumph of meaning
over power. Examples of this perspective on tragedy abound in the stories of Jewish
and Christian heroes and martyrs and in such modem stories as those of Martin
Luther King, Jr., and the young Jewish volunteers who were murdered by police
officers and buried in a dam in Mississippi. There is meaning in such stories; we
remember the meaning; and the meaning triumphs over destructive power. Neither
the triumph nor the meaning seemed to be accessible to Sinclair Lewis. Arrowsmith
has to be taken-and I do take it-as showing truthfully the tragic nature of
professional life, but not as showing the suffering virtues that are appropriate for
living with tragedy in the lives of one's clients. As to that consequent, religious
ethic, see T. SHAFFR, supra note 23, at 58-70.

